Volume 19
Issue 1 Winter 1989 (Symposium)
Winter 1989

From Bauhaus to Courthouse: An Essay on Educating for Practice
of the Craft
John Nivala

Recommended Citation
John Nivala, From Bauhaus to Courthouse: An Essay on Educating for Practice of the Craft, 19 N.M. L.
Rev. 237 (1989).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol19/iss1/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of Law. For more
information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr

FROM BAUHAUS TO COURTHOUSE:
AN ESSAY ON EDUCATING FOR PRACTICE
OF THE CRAFT
JOHN NIVALA*

The practice of law is, at its heart, a craft. In the hands of a gifted few, it
may on occasion rise to artistry. But underlying the artistry is a mastery of the
craft.
This is no pejorative. The practice of a craft demands more than mechanical
or rote performance; it requires the exercise of individual taste and skill. It entails
an ability to plan and perform. The craft worker is ingenious, dexterous in the
design and execution of a solution to a problem.'
Following this definition, the practice of law is a craft. It is not merely an
intellectual exercise, nor is it merely the application of techniques or tricks. The
practice of law is a conjunction of ways of seeing and ways of doing, an analytical
process linked to a concrete, actual performance. The practice of law is a product
of tradition and innovation. The lawyer, learning from the past, adapts and applies
the lore in creative ways to situations which are ever new.2
*Legal Writing Instructor, University of Puget Sound Law School. B.A. 1968, Hope College; J.D. 1972,
University of Michigan; LL.M. 1986, Temple University.
I. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (compact ed. 1982) (craft is "skill, skillfulness, art; ability
in planning or performing, ingenuity in constructing, dexterity; an art, trade or profession requiring special
skill and knowledge."); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 300 (5th ed. 1979) (craft is "a trade or occupation of
the sort requiring skill and training, particularly manual skill combined with a knowledge of the principles
of the art."); WEBSTER'S NEW DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS (1973) (craft is a "pursuit involving not only
manual or mechanical labor but also allowing freedom for the exercise of taste, skill and ingenuity.") See
also Eisele, The Activity of Being a Lawyer: The Imaginative Pursuit of Implications and Possibilities, 54
TENN. L. REV. 345, 346 (1987):
Recently a number of people, reflecting on the place of law within the map of human activities,
have given us ways to understand law that are different from those in which the law has been
approached and characterized and placed by traditional jurisprudence. From these people I have
learned to think of law as a particular activity, that of a craft or an art.
2. See S. MENTSCHIKOFF AND 1. STOTSKY, THE THEORY AND CRAFT OF AMERICAN LAW-ELEMENTS
xv (1981):
It is our strong belief. . . that theory and craft are intertwined and essential concepts of the process
of learning to become an artist in law. They are . . . the elements of the art of law. . . . The
intellectual side of the art of law emanates from and is directly responsive to the technical skills
of the lawyer.
See also Elkins, Professing Law: Does Teaching Matter?, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 35, 44 (1986): "When law
as a way of seeing and as a way of doing are conjoined, it gives us an image of law as craft." Professor
Elkins added this footnote:
There is a value in being able to do things with your hands. We turnto the kind of making and
doing that is associated with our hand when we have a need to see a product, a result, something
tangible that follows from our labors. This practical, physical, concrete "doing," when linked to
an aesthetic concern produces craft. . . .A craft, then, is a doing. It is a technique, but it is more
than what we do with our hands. Craft is also a way we use our minds; it is an attitude of mind,
a way of relating to materials, a way in which the bringing of materials together with appropriate
skill and attitude transform them into a new whole. Craft is a skill of making and doing, but also
a matter of mindfulness. It is a way of being.
Id. at 44-45, n. 28.
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Viewing a profession as a craft is not unique to the law. It does, however,
have a special emphasis in our profession where most of those who study law
are preparing for a lawyering career of assisting others to reach their goals in
an efficient, competent way.' The primary goal of the law school must be the
education of professionals capable of good lawyering performance, capable of
practicing the craft.'
The methods primarily used to achieve this goal seem frustratingly inadequate.
A traditional case method form of legal education develops, and develops well,
a narrow intellectual quality. It fails, miserably, to impart other traits necessary
for competent lawyering.' It leaves out educational elements necessary for the
lifetime of learning which the practice of law demands: learning from self and
from others. 6 For instance, the lawyer's role in interacting with clients, colleagues, adversaries, and courts is not given the proper attention or perspective. 7
And if these other elements are taught at all, they are too often taught too
narrowly, divorced from the hard study of law and presented as if empty of
intellectual content.
Legal education has been challenged to "move beyond a narrow, rationalist
method of preparing students . . . toward a preparation that will introduce students to lawyering in all its dimensions." 8 Students should be educated for a
3. See Brown, Ifl Were Dean, 35 J.LEGAL ED. 117 (1985):
Every member of the law school faculty . .. has studied law, and teaches law. In a nutshell, very
few I feel, have studied--or teach-lawyering. It is lawyering for which a professional school
should educate and train most of its students. Such an objective means that the school is both a
law school and a lawyering school. Lawyering includes law, but law does not necessarily include
lawyering.
See also Swygert and Batey, The Opportunities of Lawyering and the Demands of Law School, in MAxmIztiNG
THE LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENCE I I (Swygert and Batey eds. 1983):
If you wish to help others as alawyer, you must first undertake a difficult but enlightening endeavorthe disciplined, contextual study of law, lawyering, and legal process. You attend law school to
acquire not only knowledge of law, but also the ability to use the knowledge so acquired for the
betterment of society.
4. See Mudd, Beyond Rationalism: Performance Referenced Legal Education; 36 J.LEGAL ED. 189,
205 (1986):
[I]f good lawyer performance is the ultimate goal of professional preparation, the first step is to
acknowledge that goal, identify the elements of good performance, and see to it that the goal is
achieved by whatever means make sense in a given law school. To do otherwise is to proclaim,
even sotto voce, that law schools are concerned about imparting knowledge, but are unconcerned,
confused, or ignorant about whether their students can perform adequately as lawyers.
See also Brink, SartorResartus-The Professor Takes the Exam, 32 J.LEGAL ED. 362,363 (1982); Feinman
and Feldman, Achieving Excellence: Mastery Learning in Legal Education, 35 J.LEGAL ED. 528, 528-29
(1985).
5. See Holmes, Education for Competent Lawyering-Case Method in a Functional Context, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 535, 539 (1976)
6. See Klare, The Law-School Curriculum in the 1980s: What's Left?, 32 J. LEGAL ED. 336, 341 (1982):
What is left out of the law-school curriculum? Omitted is systematic training in how to learn from
others; ... in how to learnabout lawyeringfrom practice, that is,in how to acquire the capacity
for continuing self-development over the span of a career; and in how one might act in the central
relationships that constitute the lawyering process: adversary, client, coworker relationships, and
so on. Omitted also is systematic training in how to work closely and cooperatively with others in
situations of high vulnerability and high risk, and, finally, in how to think critically about morals
and politics based on the best learning available from the social sciences and from ethical discourse.
(emphasis in original)
7. See Morgan, Teaching Students for the 21st Century, 36 J.LEGAL ED. 285, 287 (1986) and Brown,
supra note 3, at 118.
8. Mudd, supra note 4, at 196.
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lifetime of lawyering, for becoming and remaining competent in the craft.9 This
goal requires a reshaping of the relationship between the classroom and the
workroom. Legal education cannot afford to be balkanized into antagonistic
competing camps.,o It is a whole, an interweaving of the doctrinal and the doing,
a concrete, specific, personal, real life application of the abstracted and theoretical." Legal education must be pluralistic, not monolithic. 2 The benefits of
so changing legal education would flow to the teacher as well as the taught.' 3
This essay will focus on a fascinating historical intersection of two educatorsWalter Gropius and Karl Llewellyn. These men, teaching in widely different
professions (design and law), 4 at approximately the same times, sought to rescue
9. See Swygert and Batey, A Plea for Greatness, in MAXIMIZING, supra note 3, at 226:

[W]e need to take a longer view of what we are about. We are not here [inlaw school] merely to
survive the course, to get through the next set of examinations, to receive the next paycheck, or
to "get by." We are here to become educated, competent professional men and women. This
professionalization process iscoterminous with our careers. Increased knowledge, deeper insights,
better skills--they all contribute to our personal identity and to our professionalism. To be really
good, to be a "pro," to realize our potentials-these are things to get excited about.

See also Jacob, Developing Lawyering Skills and the Nurturing of Inherent Traits andAbilities, in MAXIMIZING,

supra note 3, at 22:
[TMhe law student must begin to develop skills which he will need in practice. I say "begin" to
develop because . . . lawyering is a process which commences on the first day of law school and
does not end until retirement from practice. Becoming and remaining an outstanding lawyer is a
lifetime process.
10. See Horwitz, Are Law Schools Fifty
Years Out of Dale?, 54 UMKC L. REv. 385, 391-92 (1986):
[W]e dramatically need to reconceive the relationship between the classroom and practice. The
Langdellian compromise, which in order to gain the prestige of the university basically cast
contempt on practice and consigned it to the role of plumbing, was a weak conception.
See also Holmes, supra note 5, at 562:

The theory-practice dissension results in a fractionalized conception of legal education as a system
of diverse and conflicting educative elements. The tension implicit in that division tends to cause
educators to stress the importance of teaching certain skills, doctrines and perspectives to the
exclusion of others. But there is no one educative keystone in legal education. Rather, legal
education is one dynamic that could more properly be regarded as a spectrum consisting of a
broad sequence of related and dependent qualities.

1I.See Pepe, Clinical Legal Education: Is Taking Rites Seriously a Fantasy, Folly, or Failure?, 18 U.

Mich. J.L. REF. 307, 339 (1985); Holmes, supra note 5, at 564-65.

12. See Lubet, What We Should Teach (But Don't) When We Teach Trial Advocacy, 37 J. LEGAL ED.

123, 123-24, 142 (1987). See also Christensen, Horizons of Legal Advocacy, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 28,
40 (1978):
A union of the scholarship of the law schools and the experience of the profession, institutionalized
within the law schools, can promote optimum development of legal advocacy. Such a union would
advance the emotional, moral, and intellectual integrity of legal advocacy.
13. See Cramton,The Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J. Legal Ed. 321, 335 (1982); Morgan,

supra note 7, at 291.
14. The differences, at least in educational approaches, are not as substantial as may first appear. This
article argues that the law is an art which, in its educational aspect, should have as its end the teaching of
students to do something requiring practicing craft abilities as well as doctrinal knowledge and the making
them aware of the possibilities for exercising their capacities for invention, taste and ingenuity.
See Freund, Dedication Address: The Mission of the Law School, 9 UTAH L. REV. 45 (1964):

Art can be defined as the imposing of a measure of order on the disorder of experience, while
respecting and not suppressing the underlying diversity, spontaneity, and disarray. Is not this
likewise the meaning and function of law?

See also Frankel, Curing Lawyers' Incompetence: Primum Non Nocere, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 613, 633

(1977):

Especially for the advocate, the practice of law is an art, truly a performing art. The style and
strategy of asking questions, the tactics of cross-examination, the intellectual and emotional
mastery of techniques of persuasion, the uses of voice, stance, gait, gesture, and the countless
subtle tricks and gadgets of the forensic arena-- all comprise an ineffable and infinitely variable
ensemble that defies reduction to formula, uniformity, mechanical acquisition, or replication.
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their professions from academic sterility and infuse them with craft qualities.
Their attempts provide a lesson for the present.
Gropius was born in 1883, ten years before Llewellyn. He died in 1969, seven
years after Llewellyn. Both were educated in Germany; Gropius totally, Llewellyn briefly. Both served in the German military during World War I; both were
wounded; both won the Iron Cross (Gropius first class, Llewellyn second). After
completing their educations, both entered private practice before turning to teaching. Gropius founded the Bauhaus, a school of design; Llewellyn was a founder
5
and major exponent of legal realism, a school of jurisprudence. Their ideas
6
stimulate.
to
and energy continue
7
Walter Gropius was "the patient pedagogue, the synthesizer of ideas."' He
was a man of catholic interests, protean talent, unflagging energy, and widespread
influence.' 8 He was concerned always with balance and proportion, with harmonizing real world experience and theoretical training, with using contemporary
9
problems to illustrate historical lessons.' Above all, he wanted to equip his
students with the ability and confidence to learn from their efforts:
[N]o one is able to appreciate any display of ability in any field if he,
himself, has not to a certain degree taken part in its problems and difficulties
at some time .... [The student] emerges from school and college filled to
the brim with knowledge, but he rarely has been engaged in the task of
meeting himself. I think we have been exceedingly successful so far in
working out ways of acquainting our children with the accomplishments of
the past, but I do not think we are as successful in stimulating them to come
forth with their own ideas .... They have lost the joyful, playful urge of
their early youth to shape things into new forms and have become, instead,
self-conscious onlookers.'

Like Gropius, Karl Llewellyn had a zeal for teaching. 2' He too promoted the
15. For a biographical sketch of Gropius see OBITUARIES FROM THE TIMES 325 (Roberts ed. 1975) and
WEBSTER'S AMERICAN BIOGRAPHIES 434 (Van Doren ed. 1974). For Llewellyn see DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 474 (Garraty ed. 1981) and the obituary in THE NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 15, 1962.
16. See Von Eckardt, DisappointingAccount of the Bauhaus Years (Book Review), 76 ARCH. No. 9,
Sept. 1987, at 131:
[The Bauhaus] was the clearing house of many of the ideas that have shaped 20th-century art,
architecture, and design. The energy still propels us. We still keep arguing about the ideas.
See also Gerwin and Shupack, Karl Llewellyn's Legal Method Course: Elements of Law and Its Teaching
Materials, 33 J.LEGAL EO. 64 (1983); Ross, Introducing Law (Book Review), 87 COLUM. L. REV. 859,
870 (1987):
One could choose to present the world of law as best we know it, with all its mystery, oddities,
and incoherence. This choice may be exemplified by Llewellyn's The Bramble Bush, a work of
astonishing durability. Llewellyn's collection of lectures . . .delivered over fifty years ago, still
seems the standard work on the subject, notwithstanding the complex and distinctly unscientific
world of law he depicts and the dense prose he employs.
17. W. VON ECKARDT, A PLACE TO LIVE 70 (1967).
18. See Jacobsohn, An Artistic Brotherhood, 161 NEW REPUB. No. 15, Oct. 1I,1969, at 29-30; Walter
Gropius: Faguswerk, 131 ARCH. FORUM No. 2,Sept. 1969, at 34.
19. SeeT. WOLFE, FROM BAUHAUS TO OUR HOUSE 45 (1981); Gropius, Tradition and Continuity in
Architecture (pt.2). 135 ARCH. REC. No. 7, June 1964, at 138.
20. W. GROPIUS, SCOPE OF TOTAL ARCHITECTURE 39-40 (1955).
21. See Douglas, Karl N. Llewellyn, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 (1962). See also Clark, Karl N. Llewellyn,
29 U. CHI. L. REV. 614 (1962); Schnader, Karl N. Llewellyn, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 617 (1962); Jones,
Pelagius, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 619 (1962); Corbin, A Tribute to Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 805 (1962);
Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813 (1962).
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students' personal growth, urging their development not simply in knowledge
of law but in the ability to appreciate the law as
an activity, a skilled activity, an activity to be carried on according to crafttraditions and craft-standards of ideals and skills, an activity which involves
expert knowledge and use of the law, and also other lines of expertness, but
which involves all of these not in the abstract, but in concrete work over
the concrete problems of a client ... "
For Llewellyn, the essence of craft was "a recognizable line of work, practiced
by recognizable craftsmen"; it was characterized by skills leading to "reckonable
• . . [and] decent results to the patron of the craft ..
23
This essay will discuss the situations Gropius and Llewellyn faced, the goals
they sought to achieve, and the problems they encountered. The final section
will discuss a lesson to be learned from their efforts.
I.
In terms familiar to students of the debate between practicing and academic
lawyers, Walter Gropius described a gap between industrial and creative people;
the businessman "accuses the artist of lack of practical discipline while the latter
accuses the businessman of lack of taste." 2' He sought to bridge that gap and
fuse the two, to train people in the design of tasteful, practical products. He
began by establishing a new school-the Bauhaus-which joined together academies of art and craft. Gropius believed the theoretical academy had barricaded
itself behind an arid historicism in an effort to keep out what it perceived to be
an industrial rabble. From behind its barricade, the academy derided the efforts
of those who had enlisted in the new industrial order. Gropius wanted to tear
down the barriers, invite the old to mingle with the new, and eventually to
achieve a fusion of the two.'
The academy's isolationist position cut off a valuable lesson from the past
22. Llewellyn, Bunn, Cavers, Falkner, Freezer and Moreau, The Place of Skills in Legal Education,
45 COLUM. L. REV. 345, 367 (1945).
23. K.N. LLEWELLYN, Law and the Social Sciences-Especially Sociology, in JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 364-65 (1962). See also Asper, Some Old Fashioned Notions About Legal
Education Accompanied by Some Ultra-Conservative Suggestions, 25 MD. L. REV. 273, 285 (1965):
lLlawyers are 'doers' . . . . Legal problems require solutions .... What [the client) is looking
for is someone to help him make repairs or salvage some of the wreckage. A client told that "the
law" prevents him from doing what he wants to do is not usually prepared to drop the matter
there: he will want some help in determining what he can do, from someone capable of understanding his needs and objectives and resourceful enough to help him design and execute a proper
method of satisfying them.
24. H. WINGLER, THE BAUHAUS 23 (1976) (quoting Gropius, Recommendations for the Founding of
an Educational Institution as an Artistic Counseling Service for Industry, the Trades, and the Crafts).
25. See Sweeney, The Bauhaus-1919-28, 97 NEW REPUB. 287, Jan. 1I,1939, where the author noted
Gropius' feeling that "the academy had set up a barrier between the artist and the world of industry and
handicraft, and that the artist and the technician had too long been held apart." He noted that:
the term "Bauhaus" suggests first of all a teaching system intended by its originators to be the
reverse of the usual "academic" approach. In the eyes of the men who founded the Bauhaus, the
prevalent system of teaching art was based on an eclectic estheticism, on a heaping up of information, on a vicarious knowledge of technical processes and material, and on drawing-board
realizations. It was based on books rather than the use of one's eyes and hands.
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where "the artist enriched all the arts and crafts of a community because he had
a part in its vocational life, and because he acquired through actual practice as
much adeptness and understanding as any other worker who began at the bottom
and worked his way up." 26 By withdrawing the artist from the community where
27
things were done, the academy drained the artist of vitality and relevance. The
displaced
generally
result, for Gropius, was that "[e]sthetic connoisseurship had
a creative conception of art." 28 Values, and the realization of values, were based
solely on tradition and authority. The accepted education "involved the passing
on of developed techniques and other individuals' interpretations of experiences." '29 Specialized training gave the student specialized knowledge without
teaching the student the meaning or aim of the work or the artist's relationship
to the larger community.3 n
This training, which ignored the fantastic development in industrial processes,
the cataclysmic events of World War I, and ongoing social upheavals, was
doomed. A new training was needed, one which combined creative vision and
manual dexterity. Gropius wanted to "draw the artist from his pathological
seclusion by bringing him into contact with the therapeutic realities of the working
world and at the same time broaden the rigid, narrow and almost exclusively
material outlook" of industrial leaders. 3'
Gropius resented the walls which "deforming academic training" had built,
walls which separated people within the creative community from themselves
32
and from the greater community they were supposed to serve. Those walls
encouraged insularity, sterility, irrelevance. Gropius encouraged his students to
do as well as listen, to act on knowledge as well as accumulate knowledge, so
they could "once more achieve a new productive coordination, and. . .33gradually
become indispensable collaborators in the working life of the people.
Gropius sought to reunite the fine and applied arts, to heal "the cleft between
advocates of the arts as functional and subordinate to society in some way and
those advocating art as pure and idealistic endeavour."' He also saw that imi26. Gropius, The Theory and Organizationof the Bauhaus, in FORM AND FUNcTION 119 (Benton, T.
and C. eds. 1975).
27. See W. GROPIUS, THE NEW ARCHITECTURE AND THE BAUHAUS 40 (1936); W. GROPIUS, supranote
20, at 49.
28. W. GROPIUS, supra note 20, at 71.
29. A. GREENBERG, ARTISTS AND REVOLUTION: DADA AND THE BAUHAUS, 1917-25, 119 (1979).

30. Such an education also damages the student studying law. See Levin, Beyond Mere Competence,
1977 B.Y.U. L. REv. 997, 1003:
[The lawyer] should be able to comprehend the body of the law as a living thing rather than a
static set of doctrine .... [A] sensitivity to the weaknesses and infirmities of long established
doctrines may be more important than knowledge of the substance of such doctrines .... The
successful practitioner ... is one who has been educated to question accepted doctrines and to
be sensitive to the vulnerability of received learning.
See also W. GROPIUS, supra note 20, at 12.
31. Gropius, Where Artists and Technicians Meet, in FORM AND FUNCION, supra note 26, at 147
(emphasis in original).
32. Gropius, New Ideas on Architecture in PROGRAMS AND MANIFESTOES ON 20TH-CENTURY ARCHITEcrURE 46 (Conrads ed. 1970).
33. Gropius, The Theory and Organization of the Bauhaus, in BAUHAUS 1919-1928, 24-25 (Bayer,
Gropius, W., and Gropius, I. eds. 1938).
34. A. GREENBERG, supra note 29, at 56. The author noted that:
[clooperation between artists and artisans ... in the Bauhaus was necessary to initiate the
development of individuals combining the talents of both, a prelude to the acting in concert of
artist and society and to the gradual reintegration of the former with the latter; thus would art be
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tative industrial conformity was as destructive as academic insularity. In either
case, young workers or students did not receive the stimulus necessary for creative
resourcefulness." They did not engage the problems of individual awareness and
involvement, did not develop the capacity for self-criticism, self-transformation,
and individual creation in real world situations.36 They accepted industrial and
academic values uncritically, without regard for individual discovery and growth.
Imitation rather than individual conception was the norm; the young reflected
the values of others without learning to think and act for themselves.
This situation in design education motivated Walter Gropius; a similar situation
in legal education motivated Karl Llewellyn. Llewellyn felt law schools failed
to train in the legal craft, failed to equip students for the things that lawyers do,
failed to integrate "the human and artistic with the legal." 37
Gropius sought to recapture values inherent in an earlier apprentice system
where the teaching master was both visionary and doer. Llewellyn likewise saw
virtues in apprenticeship training which need recapture and which can be
recaptured even in the classroom. It is striking that other professions devote
much schooling time to one or another form of the applied arts which the
student is expected later to practice .... And whatever the deficiencies of

the older apprenticeship instruction in law, it did have this value of bringing
instruction in the craft-skills, in how to do legal jobs well and wisely. It still
has that value, as any lawyer can testify who ever was broken in under a
good senior.3"
Llewellyn believed many characteristics of the legal craft had been forgotten or
devalued as "shallow and often ignoble artifice and trickery." 39 He saw them,
as Gropius saw design craft qualities, "in terms ... of deep truths about man's
nature and man's life with his fellowman" and "essential to any professional
work. "4
reasserted as a part of life in its totality .... It was precisely this factor of unity that vitally
overcame the divisiveness that marred the traditional academy and the relationships between fine
arts academies and schools of applied arts.
35. See Von Eckardt, The Bauhaus, 4 HORIZON No. 2,Nov. 1961, at 62-63: "Such a new school would
have to select talented young people, before they had surrendered to the conformity of the industrial
community or had withdrawn into ivory towers, and train them to bridge the gap between the rigid thinking
of the businessman and the imagination of the creative artist."
Gropius was also concerned about the selection of teachers. See GROPius, supra note 20, at 56:
Teachers should be appointed only after sufficient practical experience of their own, both in design
and building. The trend to engage young men as teachers who have just completed an academic
training is harmful. For only teachers with broad experience can muster the desirable resourcefulness so necessary to stimulate the student consistently all along. The best education can offer
is stimulation, for it makes the student eager to use his own initiative.
36. See A. GREENBERG,supra note 29, at 118:
[Tlhe members of the Bauhaus were concerned with the problems of individual awareness and
involvement. Awareness entailed the self, the surrounding world, and the elements composing
that world; involvement had to do with criticism, transformation, and construction in and of the
world and its component elements. A major aspect of this general concern was the consideration
of the basis upon which values were accepted .... Acceptance of values on the basis of traditiion
and authority, an uncritical acceptance of values which the representatives of society, including
•. . teachers ... seek to pass on, is an abdication of responsibility on the part of the individual,
especially for society's adaptability and future growth.
37. Gerwin and Shupack, supra note 16, at 67.
38. Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 364.
39. Llewellyn, Advancement of the Law, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. REc. No. 2 at 28 (1958).
40. Id.
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Gropius reacted to a situation in which design education and educators had
become too withdrawn and tradition bound. Llewellyn saw legal education and
educators as stupendously inadequate-undirected and inefficient."' Legal education, like design education, was constricted by an ideology of orthodoxy, an
42
"ideology of 'the single right line' (which is, of course, My line or Our line)."
The legal professoriate, like the design, was "fat, soft," unwilling to construct
an integrated method for transmitting both material and technique.43
Llewellyn complained that legal education spawned legions of incompetent
lawyers." It shielded the student from contact with the practical craft, the active
doing of a lawyer's task, and replaced it with abstractions.45 Legal education
did not fulfill its mission of producing craft workers who could stand on their
own feet and competently serve the public." Law students, like design students,
41. See K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 139 (1960), where he gave his students
a further, final reason why it behooves you to take on for yourselves this job of education ....
It is the stupendous inadequacy, the lack of direction, the inefficiency in legal education. . . . We
have but the slightest inkling of whither we should take you. We have but one vehicle worked
out to take you anywhere, and that vehicle, unaltered, passes its point of maximum return before
the journey is half done. Our teaching technique we have learned one by one in the helterskelter
grab bag of experience, and have carried for the most part unaltered into wholly changed conditions,
as to size, as to make-up of class, as to material taught. Our machinery for checking our results
would set an intelligent ass to braying.
See also W. JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAWYERS: A STUDY IN THE CLASH OF PROFESSIONAL CULTURES xi-xii
(1978):
The present contours of legal education . . . are not so much the product of systematic and
sustained discussion of how best to teach young men and women legal techniques and professional
values but instead are the result of piecemeal adjustment to changing academic and professional

concerns.
42. Llewellyn, On the Problem of Teaching "Private" Law, 54 HARV. L. REV. 775, 798-99 (1941).
43. Llewellyn, Lawyers' Ways and Means, and the Law Curriculum, 30 IOWA L. REV. 333,336 (1945).
44. See Llewellyn, The Bar's Trouble, and Poultices-And Cures?, 5 L. & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 104, 129
(1938):
The fact is that a third or more of the lawyers now in practice in metropolitan areas are incompetent.
Law school faculties give degrees to men to whom the faculty members would under no conditions

entrust their personal business. Bar examiners find no way to keep such men out of the Bar.

Practicing lawyers, individualistically organized by tradition, feel no responsibility for training
the green, raw rookies from the schools, even the good ones-though . . . any error by any one
of them blots and blurs not only the reputation but the very livelihood of all but the best established
of the Bar.
45. See Llewellyn, On the Why ofAmerican Legal Education, 4 DUKE BAR ASSN. J. 19, 22 (1936):
By the time we get to the use of textbooks in a school we no longer have the boy in intimate
contact with the personality of the person who is actively doing things. What you are learning
has become abstract; to be gotten out of air. But minds in the American community do not work
very well that way. Our thinking needs the concrete. It is the essence not only of our law but of
our entire way of life. We hate theory. We are good on the concrete.
46. See K.N. LLEWELLYN, The Study of Law as a Liberal Art, in JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 23, at
381 ("The American law school has as its task to turn out a graduating class of craftsmen each of whom
can stand on his own legal feet." (emphasis in original)); Llewellyn, Where Do We Go from Here?, 7 AM.
L. SCH. REV. 1037, 1039 (1934) ("1 say you [law professors] carry a responsibility to your graduates to
see that they can respect themselves and serve the public both at once."). See also Gerwin and Shupack,
supra note 16, at 68:
By 1948 . . . Llewellyn had declared legal education to be in a state of "crisis." He was highly
critical of the use of the case method solely for teaching rules and principles of law. In his view,
one of the major problems with the case method was that teachers saw their role to instruct in
subject matter rather than in the skills of a lawyer. They therefore sought to extract from the
materials bodies of rules rather than principles of legal crafts to be studied both in theory and in
practice.
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were crammed full of rules rather than exposed to the practice of their craft.
A cause of, and a cure for, this situation lay with the law school professor.
Llewellyn called for instructors of vision "alive to the reasons that make one
rule rather than another useful for the ends law is to serve." 47 Rules were not
to be ignored but were to be seen in an operational setting, as functional,
necessary for getting a job done.4" Rules were tools "seen as being not the very
substance of the discipline, but instead as being some of the measures by which
the men of the discipline go about the jobs of the institution." 49 Like Gropius,
Llewellyn believed practitioners should know something articulate about the
performance as well as the philosophical aspects of their craft."
Llewellyn's scorn was not limited to professors. He likewise dismissed practitioners who saw themselves "as the priests of what is right" pitching their
"discussion upon the moral plane.""' He wanted effective action, an integration
of knowing and doing, a practical creation. Like Gropius, he wanted to bridge
the gap between theory and practice:

[To study a craft is to study men at concrete activity, to watch the little
coral beasties at work on their individual living and on their individual
contributions of by-product. No discipline is healthy in which the practicalarts side is not in steady interplay with the theoretical: providing problems,
Turn
providing experience and insight, testing and retesting theory ....
your eyes and work loose on a sustained use of the craft-and-craftsmen
concept, and you find of necessity that one foot remains planted in theory,
goes up between practice
Your bridge 52
the other in the practical work ....
and theory, and it carries steady traffic, two-way.
Without denying the lawyer's need for theoretical training, Llewellyn equally
stressed the lawyer's need to get down to cases, to do something for a specific
individual in a specific situation. This is what legal education neglected.53
47. Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes with What Results?, 39 COMM. L. J. 336, 340 (1934).
48. See Llewellyn, The Modern Approach to Counselling and Advocacy--Especially in Commercial
Transactions, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 171 (1946).
49. K.N. LLEWELLYN, supra note 23, at 357 (emphasis in original).
50. Llewellyn, How Appellate Courts Decide Cases, 16 PA. BAR ASSN. Q. 220 (1945). Also see
Llewellyn, On What Makes Legal Research Worth While, 8 J. LEGAL ED. 399, 416 (1956) calling for the

"careful spotting, gathering, testing, recording, and systematizing of the know-how, the routines, the skills,
and so much as can be captured of the high-art aspects of the many of the various crafts of the law." The
professoriate was not receptive to Llewellyn's entreaties. See Dutile, Introduction:The Problem of Teaching
Lawyer Competency, in LEGAL EDUCATION AND LAWYER COMPETENCY 4 (Dutile ed. 1981):
It is not surprising that the traditional law teacher has not been in the forefront of the fight for
He tends to dislike the idea of law as a craft. This manifests itself
increased skills-training ....
in several ways that are negative toward clinical education. . . . In other ways as well (for example,
the common feeling that the matters he deals with are not important), the clinical professor may
be labelled a second class citizen.
51. K.N. LLEWELLYN, supra note 41, at 81.
52. K.N. LLEWELLYN, supra note 23, at 367-68.
53. See K.N. LLEWELLYN, On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence,in JURISPRUDENCE, supra
note 23, at 139:
There is in our legal system a vital and needed measure of stability and reckonability and control.
There is also in our legal system a vital and needed measure of give and adjustment, of development
and change, and of individualization, of which the study of rules of law alone, and as they stand
at any given moment, gives no adequate indication. As a practical matter it is vital for lawyers
to have the best intellectual wherewithal they can get, to judge when the court is going to be
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11.
Gropius and Llewellyn faced situations in which the craft practice aspect of
their profession was ignored or subordinated to the theoretical aspect. Both saw
their task as reconciling the two. Both wanted to produce professionals capable
of combining intellectual and performance demands, capable of standing on their
own feet in real world situations.
Gropius did not want to establish a singular design style. His goal at Bauhaus
was to establish a methodolgy of design education, a way of going about learning.'
He wanted colleagues and students who would share his
belief in the ascendence of process over form in teaching and in practice;
the importance of collaborative teamwork, both intraprofessional and interdisciplinary

. . .

the need to recognize unities in art and technology while

emphasizing the need for diversity; and the necessity of destroying the
divisions among the arts, including what [he] perceived as the artificial
distinctions between so-called fine and applied art."
Gropius sought to inculcate a method allowing the individual to make an original,
elastic approach to a distinct, real world problem.56 He, like Llewellyn, wanted
to unite that which was seen as polar. He understood
the dangers to design inherent in the separation of head and hand, theory
and practice, intellectual and manual worker, artist and craftsman. He...
tried always to bridge the arbitrary divisions between the two, to reunite
them for the common enrichment of both. .

.

. He aimed at avoiding both

the boorish illiteracy of the modem craftsman and the irresponsible precocity
of the academically trained artist. Thus he hoped to re-create in the world
of modem industrial society the same sort of healthy, organic unity in all
phases of design that had characterized all pre-industrial societies."
The Bauhaus was neither an ivory tower nor an assembly line. Its theoretical
program was infused with practical work; its practical work proceeded from a
strong theoretical foundation.58 It demanded "a new and powerful working corgoverned by the one and when it is going to be governed by the other. And as a practical matter
lawyers need help in making that judgment about individual and particular counselling situations,
individual and particular matters of litigation. The large and the long run, the sweep of the decades,
will not do the lawyer's work here. He needs in this to get down to cases. It is not enough that
"the course of decision has been characteristically steady and uniform." The lawyer needs light
on the particular case which will be up tomorrow. The older jurisprudence never did get down
to particular cases, on this problem. (emphasis in original).
54. See J. FITCH, WALTER GROPIUS 13 (1960); cf. K. HERDEG, THE DECORATED DIAGRAM 80 (1983):
[Gleneralized, abstract goals do not by definition lend themselves to interpretation and transformation in designing buildings. On the other hand, models. . . equipped with their formal structures
permit. . . the invention of analogous formal structures suited to the task at hand. It was Gropius's
wish, it seems, to eliminate the notion of the model altogether. Yet the human proclivity to perceive
and think in object (model) terms made his directives vague and the field for design action foggy.
55. Schmertz, Walter Gropius: 1883-1969, 146 ARCH. REC. No. 2, Aug. 1969, at 10.
56. See J. FITCH, supra note 54, at 13; W. GRoPlus, supra note 27, at 36.
57. J. FITCH, supra note 54, at II.
58. See Domer, The Background of the Bauhaus, in BAUHAUS 1919-1928, supra note 33, at I I (" [Firom
the very beginning, [Gropius] differed from his contemporaries in the driving earnestness with which he
attacked the problem of reconciling art and an industrialized society."); F. WHITFORD, BAUHAUS 12 (1984)
("[An] aim . . . was to establish . . . contact with the outside world [which] would ensure that the school
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relation of all the processes of creation . . . a feeling for the interwoven strands
of practical and formal work." 59
When Gropius took over the direction of design education after World War I,
he consolidated what had been separate schools-theoretical and practical-into
one. This physical act reflected his intellectual determination that fine and applied
arts were not fundamentally different. Mastery of craft technique was essential
to creative achievement. The individual could, in exalted moments, produce art,
but underlying each such moment was a solid foundation in craft practice." That
was the common ground for creative work. Gropius, like Llewellyn, saw the
interdependence of having a vision and having the ability to translate the vision
into reality.6
Gropius' aim in teaching, as in his work, was to reconcile opposites, to find
unity in diversity and use its spirit to magnify creative potential.62 Although he
rejected the cloistered structure of the old school, he did not reject theoretical
training. In working with craft problems, students would undergo a process of
discovery "both intuitively and intellectually, thus reconciling the rival claims
of subjectivity and objectivity." 63 The choice was not between producing either
individualistic pieces of art or industrially replicable products. The challenge
was to "seek unity in the fusion, not in the separation of these ways of life."'
The Bauhaus did not seek merely to infuse art into industry but to inject "the
did not become an ivory tower and that its students were fully prepared for life."); W. BEHRENDT, MODERN
BUILDING 156-57 (1937):
The object of the school was to train students in the various productive activities involved in
building, and to educate a new type of craftsman, qualified for co-operating with industry and
capable of developing for the machine-made product a new form, adapted to the technical process
of production and revealing its specific character. The school was organized as a group of workshops, intended as laboratories, in which were developed models of objects for standardized
production, models which in practical work and continued experiments were bettered and refined
in form.
59. Gropius, The Theory and Organization of the Bauhaus, in FORM AND FUNCTION, supra note 26,
at 125.
60. See G. NAYLOR, THE BAUHAUS REASSESSED 53-55 (1985) and F. WHITFORD, supra note 58, at
12, 47, and 203.
61. See Gropius, The Scope of Bauhaus Training in BAUHAUS 1919-1928, supra note 33, at 125:
What the Bauhaus preached in practice was the common citizenship of all forms of creative work,
and their logical interdependence on one another in the modem world. . . . [AII alike, artist as
well as artisan, should have a common training; and since experimental and productive work are
of equal practical importance, the basis of that training should be broad enough to give every
kind of talent an equal chance.
See also F. WHITFORD, supra note 58, at II: "The school's first aim was to rescue all the arts from the
isolation which each then (allegedly) found itself and to train the craftsmen, painters, and sculptors of the
future to embark on co-operative projects in which all their skills would be combined."
62. See Gropius, Unity in Diversity, in FOUR GREAT MAKERS OF MODERN ARCHITECTURE 218 (Placzek
gen. ed. 1970); Gropius, Tradition and Continuity in Architecture (pt.3), 136 ARCH. REC. No. I, July
1964, at 156 ("[Tlhe architect should make a constant attempt to reconcile opposites--the inward and the
outward, the solid and the void, unity and diversity."); A. GREENBERG, supra note 29, at 56:
Participation in the Bauhaus revealed at least a rather general initial agreement with the aims of
the school set forth by Gropius. Most intense, though, was not agreement with any specific aims,
but rather a belief in the importance, necessity, and possibility of developing as a basis for building
towards the future a dynamic spirit of unity, a unity in multiplicity and thereby magnified in its
creative potential.
63. G. NAYLOR, supra note 60, at 76-77.
64. Id. at 82 (emphasis in original).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

pre-industrial spirit of unity, a sense of involvement in the production of an
entire product, and quality into technological operations and mass production. "65
Unity did not demand a lockstep conformity. Gropius welcomed diverse approaches. He saw them as energizing, not divisive forces. They were a stimulus
for fresh approaches and renewed creativity. The unity he sought was not the
imposition of a rigid style or school of design training. It was the interweaving
of distinct approaches and perceptions. It was synergistic, a cooperative working
together of the discrete to produce a total effect, a new design, which rose above
that which would result if the discrete acted independently. Gropius gave "new
idea[s] a chance and. . . [strove] for the synthesis of a total co-operative effort. "'
He wanted a collaboration of independent workers rather than their subordination
to a dictated style or approach.67
In his teaching, as in his work, Gropius wanted "a whole staff of collaborators
and assistants, men who would work not as an orchestra obeying the conductor's
baton, but independent, although in close cooperation to further a common
cause." 6 He emphasized "integration and coordination, inclusiveness, not exclusiveness. , 69 He encouraged his students to come up with their own ideas; he
"did not want students to imitate or become small editions of himself. 70 He
did not want student-disciples but students who developed. He wanted them
"free to explore all angles [with] nobody coerced into narrowing channels."'"
Gropius considered conformity a curse, in education as well as design. To combat
it, he reduced the academy's overemphasis on theory and cultivated "attitudes
which will integrate emotional experience with scientific and technical knowledge. ,72
Bauhaus students learned by doing. They learned not only how to translate
their ideas into effective action but also how to work with others. The Bauhaus,
somewhat like a law school clinic, brought the students and teachers face to face
65.
66.
67.
ARCH.

A. GREENBERG, supra note 29, at 58.
Von Eckardt, supra note 35, at 69-70.
See Gropius, I., Walter Gropius and the Creation of the Bauhaus in Weimer (Book Review), 136
FORUM No. 1, Jan. 1972, at 16:
Gropius (wanted) a collaboration with other artists, craftsmen, technicians, engineers, etc., who,
though hopefully imbued with the same spirit, were supposed to make independent, complimentary
contributions to the whole. To introduce and train such collaboration was the whole idea of the
Bauhaus.
See also Schmertz, supra note 55, at 9:
Gropius' concern for the ideas and feelings of others was an essential quality of his mind and
spirit. In combination with the gift of intellect and the virtues of toughness and perseverance it
made him a great teacher and collaborator. Because he never subordinated this concern for people,
individually or in the mass, to purely formal or stylistic ideas . . . this single quality may also
be the key to his lasting eminence as an architect.
68. W. GROPIUS, supra note 20, at 7.
69. Id. See also W. GROPIUS, supra note 27, at 59-60: "Our ambition was to rouse the creative artist
from his other-worldliness and reintegrate him into the workaday world of realities; and at the same time
to broaden and humanize the rigid, almost exclusively material, mind of the business man."
70. A. FORSEE, MEN OF MODERN ARCHITECTURE 72 (1966).
71. Gropius, ., supra note 67, at 28.
72. Gropius, The Curse of Conformity, 231 SAT. EVENING POST No. 10, Sept. 6, 1958, at 52. See also
Gropius, ., supra note 67, at 16: "[Gropiusl believed throughout his life that the skills and discipline
acquired by the mastery of a craft was not only the best preparation for any kind of activity connected
with three-dimensional design, but also contributed to a person's inner harmony."
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with real world exercises which put the classroom lessons to a practical test. 73
Gropius believed that "only through constant contact with newly evolving techniques, with the discovery of new materials, and with new ways of putting things
together, [can] the creative individual . . . learn to bring the design of objects

into a living relationship with tradition and from that point develop a new attitude
toward design."" By a collaborative working through of these problems, the
Bauhaus gave back to the students "the correct feeling for the interrelation of
practical work and problems of form." 75
Gropius put the students into the workroom. Under the guidance of a master
but working on their own, students were encouraged to do as well as think, to
implement as well as ideate. Gropius could not
see why knowledge alone should be the primary object of education, when
direct experience is just as indispensible for substantive training ....

The

book and the drafting board cannot give that invaluable experience gained
by trial and error in the workshop and on the building site. Such experience
should therefore be interwoven into the training right from the start, not
added on later, after the academic part of learning has already been completed. For practical experience is the best means of guaranteeing a synthesis
of all the emotional and intellectual factors in the student's mind; it prevents
him from rushing off into "precocious" design, not sufficiently weighted
down by the know-how of the building process."6
A good education, preparing the student for a lifetime's work, whether in design
or law, "must certainly lead him beyond mere fact77information and book knowledge into direct personal experience and action. ,
Practical craft training was a complement to, not a substitute for, intellectual
discipline. Theoretical instruction ran parallel to manual training.78 Theory provided the "common basis on which many individuals are able to create together
a superior unit of work; theory is not the achievement of individuals but of
generations." 79 A thorough theoretical foundation was a necessary component
of creative effort. The resulting creation would be "intellectually controlled as
well as emotionally expressive."' It would be a practical representation of the
creative vision.
73.
of the
supra
74.

SeeR. BANHAM, THEORY AND DESIGN IN THE FIRST MACHINE AGE 278 (1960); Gropius, Programme
Staatliches Bauhaus in Weimer, in PROGRAMS AND MANIFESTOES, supra note 32, at 50; F. WHrrFORD,
note 58, at 26; W. GROPIUS, supra note 20, at 16.
Gropius, Bauhaus Dessau--Principles of Bauhaus Production, in H. WINGLER, supra note 24, at

109-10.
75. Gropius, The Viability of the Bauhaus Idea, in H. WINGLER, supra note 24, at 5 1.
76. W. GROPIUS, supra note 20, at 46-47.
77. Id. at 41. See also Eisele, supra note 1, at 349:

Students fail to see that the use of their imaginations is not some silly distraction from the serious
business of the law, nor some extraneous way of escaping the demands of their profession, but
rather pins them exactly to one of the central demands that their clients make upon them as
lawyers. For what a client wants, and what the profession demands, is that each lawyer make
use of his or her imagination to make something out of the conflicts of the law, something that
responds to a problem or conflict in the world. They demand something useful to the client and
acceptable to the profession.

78. Gropius, supra note 33, at 25-26.
79. Id. at 26.
80. F. WHrrFORD, supra note 58, at 100.
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The Bauhaus achieved a new unity encompassing "the characteristics traditionally attributed to art: emotion, spirituality, and heart, and those attributed to
technology: reason, logicality, and mind.""' Gropius' combination of these characteristics produced graduates who were creatively ambidextrous.8 2 They were
well grounded in theory, approaching problems with thought and discipline.
They were also creative and practical in executing their solutions, not by the
83
use of shallow tricks or ploys, but by their mastery of technique and form.
Bauhaus teaching imparted an attitude, not a dogma. Students were encouraged
to find new and elastic solutions to problems, to understand the correlation of
practical and formal work, and to see the advantages of collaborative work.
Walter Gropius' goal was the integration of theory and action, of head and
hand in design education.' Karl Llewellyn shared a similar goal for legal education. For him,
if there be one school in a university of which it should be said that there
men learn to give practical reality, practical effectiveness, to vision and to
[R]ightly approached, the road
ideals, that school is the school of law....
to sure vision proves to be at the same time the road to true command of
skill in practice: that that lesson from classic class-instruction is what needs
relearning and reapplication in the light of current conditions.8"
Llewellyn did not buy proposals to totally substitute clinical for classroom education just as Gropius did not abandon theoretical for practical training in design.
The goal for both was the interweaving of the two.
Like Gropius, Llewellyn passionately believed in "the livening up, the making
real, of theoretical work by practical complement." 86 For him in law, as for
Gropius in design, the immediate educational need was making the theory real,
was cultivating and making conscious the craft traits necessary to effectively
translate theory into action. 87 Llewellyn's long teaching tenure convinced him
that "it is the combination of the theory and philosophy of the crafts with some
advancing and tested skill in the crafts which stirs interest and excitement and
81. A. GREENBERG, supra note 29, at 58.
82. See Kallman, Lessons of the Bauhaus for the Second Machine Age, in FOUR GREAT MAKERS, supra
note 62, at 277.
83. See Von Eckardt, The Bauhaus in Weimer, in FOUR GREAT MAKERS, supra note 62, at 242; F.
WHrrFORD, supra note 58, at 103; Gropius, Architecture at Harvard University, 81 ARCH. REC. No. 5,
May 1937, at 10-11:

In learning the facts and tricks, some can obtain sure results in a comparatively short time, of
course; but these results are superficial and unsatisfactory because they still leave the student
helpless if he is faced with a new and unexpected situation. If he has not been trained to get an
insight into organic development no skillful addition of modem motives, however elaborate, will
enable him to do creative work.
84. Gropius, supra note 33, at 28:
[Tihe culminating point of the Bauhaus teaching is a demand for a new and powerful working
correlation of all the processes of creation. The gifted student must regain a feeling for the
interwoven strands of practical and formal work. The joy of building, in the broadest meaning

of that word, must replace the paper work of design.
85. Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 391.
86. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-CalledLegal Education, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 651, 675 (1935).
He prefaced this remark by noting that "law school is needlessly abstract, and needlessly removed from

life. There remains the fact that seeing-it-done gives reading-it-in-books new flavor, new perspective." Id.
87. See Llewellyn, The CurrentCrisis in Legal Education, I J. LEGAL ED. 211, 217 (1948).
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growth" and which fosters an "education . . .directed to all, and ... directed
not to moments but to years, to a life-time." 88 The practice of law is a liberal
art combining technical proficiency, intellectual acuity, and creative vision.89
In law as in design, the goal was to build a whole, to provide a total education
for a lifetime of professional work. To reach this goal required a collaborative
effort of students and teachers to diagnose problems, organize data, create and
test solutions, and use craft techniques to accomplish a given purpose.' It
required the development "of habit and working-skill in seeing and above all in
feeling lawyer-situations." 9'
Llewellyn's concept of legal education was devoted to lawyering, "to the
hows of effective doing of the craftman's job."92 He strove to find, articulate,
and impart those craft traits necessary for getting things done in the law. Lawyering required more than the accumulation of rule knowledge; it required seeing
how the rules worked, their effect in the real world. Practical craft knowledge
88. K.N. LLEWELLYN, Law as a LiberalArt, supra note 46, at 382 (emphasis in original).
At the end
of his career, Llewellyn reviewed some lectures he gave at its beginning:
Illf
these lectures were being done over, I am clear that their focus would shift materially off
of
"the law" as lawyers understand that term and materially onto what the institution of
law-andgovernment is for, and in particular what our own version of that institution is for, and what
the
part is--the noble and needed pan-which the various major crafts of law and the men
of law
play as their part in that institution. Knowledge of the rules of law . . .would thus move
into
perspective as being a single one out of a dozen or more necessary parts of equipment for lawyering,
and one could begin to persuade properly and cogently against the silly idea that the sound
normal
road to such knowledge is "a course" or that three years of case-courses can in themselves
possibly
provide enough of such knowledge for a respectable start on practice. One could really
go into
the question, then, of intelligent allocation of a student's time as he studies not "law",
but to
qualify for effective lawyering.
K.N. LLEWELLYN, supra note 41, at 153-54.
89. K.N. LLEWELLYN, Law as LiberalArt, supra note 46, at 379-80. See also Mentschikoff
and Stotzky,
Law-The Last of the Universal Disciplines, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 695, 700-03 (1986):
[Liaw is an art, requiring vision and good sense. Theory and craft are intertwined and are
essential
concepts of the process of learning how to become an artist in law. The best practical training
a
law school can give to any lawyer is the study of law as a liberal art. In this vision
of legal
education, there are three necessary components to a first rate education--he technical,
the
intellectual, and the spiritual. Without a rigorous training in effective technical proficiency,
the
mechanical aspect of the law, one lacks the base for theory. The intellectual side of the art
of law
emanates from and is dependent upon the level of technical proficiency enjoyed by the
lawyer.
Just as in other arts, technical mastery liberates instead of binds. . . . It builds on tradition,
on
what came before, to allow brilliant new creations in the resolutions of disputes or in the
pursuit
of justice. At the same time, the judge, lawyer, or scholar is forced to be continually responsive
to reasoned justification within that tradition. . . .Yet this very limitation of means in the
art of
law, as in any other art, liberates as well as binds the artist. It frees up the creative energies
of
the artist. It also allows the legal actor to strive for beauty or service in the art of law, both
within
and without formal legal institutions. This is the fulfillment of the spiritual aspect of the
law.
90. Llewellyn, supra note 87, at 215.
91. Llewellyn, McDougal and Lasswell Plan for Legal Education, 43 COLUM. L. REv.
476, 478-79
(1943) (emphasis in original).
92. Llewellyn, The Adventures ofRollo, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. Rec. No. I at 23-24 (1958).
[W]e in this School have got to put [technique and ideals] together and, by the same token,
we
shall devote our schooling of you largely to lawyering, to the hows of effective doing
of the
craftman's job. Inevitably . . .that leads to a study and to an appreciation and an evaluation
also
of the ideals of the craft and of its goals. But not "The Law", the rules of law, any knowledge
about things that are in books, is what we are primarily after. We are after exercise
in the
craftmanship jobs. And that is why there is no substitute for classwork. Only in classwork
do
you get a chance to go through the exercises.
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was a necessary component of effective lawyering, perhaps more so than tra93
ditional knowledge or rule formulation.
For Llewellyn, as for Gropius, the educational goal was to turn out professionals who had the necessary tools to practice their craft. Llewellyn always
worried about the doing, about the individual lawyer's "needs in dealing with
lawyers' problems about lawyers' individual cases."' He wanted to teach students the qualities of the good lawyer: "Vision and sense for the Whole, and
skills in finding ways, smoothing friction, handling men in any situation, with
95
speed, with sureness." Like Gropius, he wanted to give the traditional educational factors-"doctrinal clarity, conceptual precision, sharpness of legal
thought"-a human, working focus.' He wanted students to see the lawyer's
craft characteristics "for what they are: in essence, hugely resilient and versatile
skills for sizing up situations wisely, and then of getting things done, skills of
trouble-shooting, trouble-evasion, and forward planning.""
III.
Lofty goals often lead to major disappointments. This was true for both Gropius
and Llewellyn. They stated, with persuasive force, the deficiencies in design
and legal education and the goals for which education should reach. But the
execution of reform calls for the cooperation of others who share the vision.
Gropius had to fight to get it even within the Bauhaus; Llewellyn remained a
lonely voice.
In a sense, Gropius' task was the easier. He was handed his own school and
what he thought was a mandate to reform design education. However, reform
needs reformers. Gropius' goal was educating for creative ambidexterity, the
ability to synthesize the theoretical and practical aspects of design. He wanted
graduates who were able to competently bridge the gap between the classroom
and the workroom. They were to be tandem taught by theorists-"Masters of
98
Form"--and practitioners-"Workshop Masters"-who were in theory equal.
The Bauhaus faculty included "the purely creative and disinterested artist...
as a spiritual counterpoint to the practical technician in order that they may work
and teach side by side for the benefit of the student. ""
The resulting reality is predictable by anyone familiar with the traditional/
clinical approaches in law schools. Relationships either never developed or deteriorated quickly. The director and the masters fought, the Form Masters and
the Workshop Masters fought, and the students fought with everybody. Perhaps
this was to be expected in a setting where social revolution appeared not merely
inevitable but as regular as the morning paper.
93. See K.N. LLEWELLYN, American Common Law Tradition, and American Democracy in JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 23, at 283; Llewellyn, The Conditions for and the Aims and Methods of Legal
Research. 6 AM. L. SCH. REV. 663, 673 (1930); K.N. LLEWELLYN, Law as Liberal Art, supra note 46,
at 380-8 1.
94. K.N. LLEWELLYN, supra note 53, at 139 (emphasis in original).
95. Llewellyn, The Crafts of the Law Re-Valued, 15 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. I, 7 (1942) (emphasis in

original).
96. Llewellyn, supra note 42, at 779. See also Gerwin and Shupack, supra note 16, at 74 and 92.

97. Llewellyn, supra note 48, at 167 (note).

939
, 85 ARCH. REC. No. 1,Jan. 1939, at 71;F. WHITFORD,
98. See Levy, Bauhaus andDesign-19)9-1
supra note 58, at 30.
99. BAUHAUS 1919-1928, supra note 33, at 6.
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Gropius preached collaboration; his staff practiced competition to the point
where Form Masters encouraged students to avoid working with the Workshop
Masters. Many Form Masters were not interested in even visiting the workshops;
those who did were met with resentment by the Workshop Masters. On top of
natural competitive rivalries there was piled an organizational imbalance. The
Form Masters participated in the overall decisionmaking for the school; the
Workshop Masters, like many law school counterparts, were shut out. The Form
Master received overall better treatment from the school than the Workshop
Master. " Ironic as it was, Gropius' designation of two master types "perpetuated
the cultural class system and the position of each within the Bauhaus hierarchy
actually exacerbated it.' ' I ° The Workshop Masters became distanced from the
rest of the faculty and many of the students.'o
The Bauhaus students, like many law students, were disadvantaged by the
dual master system. An early critic noted that it was
strikingly clear that if they do not relate to each other or to life, each of
these masters is wrapping himself up in his own solitary world[.] Since these
masters lack a homogenous background or a common intellectual attitude,
there is no possibility of collective discipline in the training of the pupils.
Educational discipline based on individual conceptions can only lead to dead
dogma. , 3
100. See F. WHITFORD, supra note 58, at 48-49, 65; A. GREENBERG, supra note 29, at 92.
The parallel
with the status of clinical legal education is striking. See Kissam, The Declineof Law SchoolProfessionalism,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 313 (1986):
The clinical movement's ability to effect reform will be diminished if the new formalism becomes
further entrenched in law school practices. One obvious impediment is the substantial cost....
Another obstacle is the significant, often subtle, resistance of traditional classroom faculty to
the incorporation of clinical training into the "mainstream" of American legal education. The
more open manifestations of this resistance include a refusal to entertain budgetary reallocations,
formalist requirements of scholarship for clinic teachers, and often a second-class citizenship
for the clinical faculty. The more subtle forms of resistance may include a failure to award
adequate time and educational credits to students for clinical work, an absence of general faculty
advice that students should do clinical work, an amiable faculty skepticism toward the development of innovative clinics or simulated clinical programs. . . . ['here are theoretical or ideal
visions of clinical education that promise very beneficial reforms, but there are also the significant
realities of limited resources, institutional inertia, and the paradigmatic resistance of formalist
law professors that certainly will limit and ultimately may defeat this promise.
101. F. WHITFORD, supra note 58, at 48.
102. Again, there is a parallel with law school clinicians. See Burg, Clinic in the Classroom:
A Step
Toward Cooperation, 37 J. LEGAL ED. 232, 232-33 (1987):
I came to my clinician's job committed to active and self-reflective learning for my students.
In
this attitude I (fairly or not) quickly felt isolated among my faculty colleagues. True, I occupied
a tenure-track position; and my more traditionally oriented peers were generally supportive
of
our clinic. But I felt that my belief in the importance of well-structured experiential learning,
and in the need for less Socrates and more Bellow, distanced me and my program from
the
institutional mainstream. This sense of separation was heightened by several other factors: concern
over the high cost of running our clinic relative to the instructional budget of the school as
a
whole; a continuing gap in status and benefits between "regular" faculty and the two staff
attorneys with whom I was working; and difficulty reconciling the time demands of the clinic's
directorship with expectations of scholarship and publication.
103. Huszar, The Staatliche Bauhaus in Weimer, in FORM AND FUNCTION, supra note 26, at
94-95. See
also W. VON ECKARDT, supra note 17, at 6. In the legal academy, there are "many very able
academic
lawyers who, for whatever reasons, do not venture outside the ivy-covered walls, scom
the practicing
lawyer and his work (deprecate it) and look for rewards only from within the universities."
Wellington,
Challenges to Legal Education: The "Two Cultures" Phenomenon, 37 J. LEGAL ED. 327,
329 (1987).
Professor Wellington described the impact on the students:
This phenomenon would not matter too much if it were not for the inescapable fact that
the
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Gropius' theory was that students would work with each other and with the
masters in developing the breadth and depth of their individual vision and the
ability to recreate that vision. Gropius described what happened:
The free, speculative work [which the students produce] during the first
half-year and the large doses of intellectual fare [they are given] are obviously
overloading their minds and are leading these people-for the most part still
too young and not yet independent-into arrogance, and a misunderstanding
of who and what they are. The corrective provided by working with their
hands is almost entirely absent, since workshop training .
each individual.'

.

. is left up to

At least, Llewellyn might have said, Gropius had his own school, had control
over the selection of faculty and students, had the final say over curriculum and
methodology. Llewellyn did not. What he had was a voice, a strong, articulate,
persuasive voice to be sure, but still only a voice. He could,5 and did, urge his
colleagues to reexamine their perspectives and their methods. He could trumpet
the advantages of seeing law as a craft, a doing, rather than as an abstract
science." But, except in his own courses, he could not effect the changes he
thought necessary.
Llewellyn wanted colleagues who trained students for a lifetime of effective,
efficient practice.'0 7 He wanted colleagues who taught students to appreciate
the facts and the work and the thought of lawyers at large. Lawyers think
law, lawyers argue law in court. And the job of a lawyer is to show how
the goal of "justice" in his case can be attained within the framework of
overwhelming majority of law students go into practice. They do not go into teaching. These
students find themselves-or at least many do-much less interested than their instructors in the
subject of their courses and worried, as a result of their mentor's disdain, about their own
professional future. I believe that this is one of the factors that contributes to the extensivebut perhaps not intensive--unhappiness of law students.
104. Memo from Gropius, (Feb. 13, 1923) quoted in F. WHITFORD, supra note 58 at 204-05.
105. Llewellyn was enthusiastic about the possibility of change, an enthusiasm which may have been
based more on aspiration than accomplishment. See K.N. LLEWELLYN, Some Realism About Realism, in
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 23 at 42:
Ferment is abroad in the law. The sphere of interest widens; men become interested again in the
life that swirls around things legal. Before rules, were facts; in the beginning was not a Word,
but a Doing. Behind decisions stand judges; judges are men; as men they have human backgrounds. Beyond rules, again, lie effects: beyond decisions stand people whom rules and decisions
directly or indirectly touch. The field of Law reaches both forward and back from the Substantive
Law of school and doctrine.
106. See K.N. LLEWELLYN, supra note 23, at 355-56:
The central aspect of an institution is organized activity, activity organized around the cleaning
up of some job. . . . Plainly, an important portion of any institution lies in the world of ideas ...
Yet I want to insist peculiarly on the need for including and stressing the conduct phases of the
institution--both patterned and unpattemed-and such things as physical equipment, and above
all people, both the relevant specialists and the consuming and supporting public. (emphasis in
original)
107. See K.N. LLEWELLYN, A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step, in JURISPRUDENCE, supra note
23, at 19-20 n. 12:
In his moments of action, in his actual handling of a case or situation, the measure of [the
practicing lawyer's] success in the measure in which he actually uses this approach [advocated
by Llewellyn]. . . . His job is either to guide a specific client through the difficulties of action
in a concrete situation, or to bring the personnel of a specific tribunal to a specific result. The
desired results, and not formulae, are his focus, and he uses formulae as he uses his knowledge
of both judicial tradition and individual peculiarity: as tools to reach his desired result. He can
be more effective, as any other practical manor artist can, if his technique be consciously studied.
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the law. . . . It is only in the particular, when the lawyer is thinking about
how to shape up some one case actually in hand, that the felt justice of his
cause, the need for making the court see and feel that his client is right,
looms large in his mind; and even then, it looms as a problem in fact, not
as a problem in law.'
He wanted colleagues and students to study how this service was "being accomplished, in order that we may learn how to accomplish it more effectively,
with less waste, and with fewer slip-ups." °9 He did not expect artistry from the
majority of lawyers but he did expect
as a minimum a reliable craftmanship. Technique without ideals may be a
menace, but ideals without technique are a mess; and to turn ideals into
effective vision, in matters of law, calls for passing those ideals through a
hard-headed screen of effective legal technique."'
Llewellyn's analysis is eloquent and enduring. "' But it did not significantly
alter traditional legal education."' His goal of turning out reliable legal craft
workers is seen as a fantasy and that is a sad commentary on the vision of
legal education."' He wrote that a major line of success in law "lies in
108. K.N. LLEWELLYN, supra note 53, at 137-38 (emphasis in original).

109. K.N. LLEWELLYN, supra note 53, at 141.
110. Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 346. See also K. N. LLEWELLYN, Law as a Liberal Art, supra
note
46, at 380:
Consider the indispensability of pure technique. Surely each-any-member of the practicing
art must be able to do what is needed, must be able to do it with at least a journeyman's accuracy
and dispatch, for any consumer of the art's service, and at any time. (Let me say here, fast,
that this minimum competence of each mint-marked law graduate does not appear, as yet, in
these United States.) (emphasis in original)
I 11. See Holmes, supra note 5, at 577:
IT~he issue of applied-skills training does not necessitate a choice between theory and practice.
The study of doctrine . . . is not just the study of "theory." The study of doctrine "constitutes
an intensely practical skill, perhaps the most important single skill of the practicing lawyer."
Capable analysis of theory is a necessary prerequisite to capable lawyering. Moreover, training
in lawyering operations is not simply learning the tricks of the trade because such operations
contain theoretical dimensions. Since the study of theory is practical and practical-skills study
has both theoretical dimensions and applies theory in lawyering operations, the distinction is not
between theory and practice. Rather the distinction should be between theoretical training which
is useful to private practice and theoretical training which has no practical use.
See also Pepe, supra note II, at 310.
112. See Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Educatio--A 21st-Century Perspective. 34 J. LEGAL
ED. 612
(1984) noting that modem legal education fails
to develop in students ways of thinking within and about the role of lawyers-methods of critical
analysis, planning, and decision-making which are not themselves practical skills but rather the
conceptual foundations for practical skills and for much else, just as case reading and doctrinal
analysis are foundations for practical skills and for much else.
113. See Feinman and Feldman, supra note 4, at 529:
The crucial element of our ideas about law school learning is the goal of having nearly all
students leave law school as capable novice lawyers. Probably most law professors would regard
this goal as a fantasy. . . . Student performance is widely distributed, and mediocrity is accepted
as inevitable. But satisfaction with that level of performance . . . sets standards too low and
gives too little credit to the capacities of our students and to our own capacities as teachers. It
is also shamefully inadequate for institutions that, like it or not, function as the primary filter
for admission to the bar.
See also Zillman and Gregory, Law Student Employment and Legal Education, 36 J. LEGAL ED. 390,
401
(1986):
The study suggests that, whether they like it or not, the law schools and law firms are partners
in the business of legal education and training for the bar. Rather than deplore or ignore the
partnership, professors and practitioners should assess how it might be used to produce better
law students and better lawyers.
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convincing oneself and then convincing others that the norm which [the
lawyer] desires is in fact the right norm.". Llewellyn was convinced of
the primacy of craft training in legal education. It is a misfortune that he
was unable to convert more than a few of his colleagues.
Llewellyn did not have his head in the sand. He knew how his ideas were
received. He continued to plug away, lecturing on the deficiencies of legal
education. He had his theme: "Not rules, but doing, is what we seek to train
men for.... He stuck to it over the years:
It is for the practice of law that we are to train. . . .[W]e mispose issues
and misfocus our work when we think of curriculum and deal with it as if
our major objective were equipping our students merely with some knowledge of prevailing legal doctrine-leaving almost everything else to be got
as by-product, and as by-product which receives little separate and sustained
attention .... Training in the basic craft-skills of the lawyer is the present
pressing need; effective training, even in the skills of case-law, comes now
with undue slowness and with sad unreliability; we have available possiof craftbilities of inculcating with thoroughness a considerable number
6
skills which we now leave largely neglected or to accident."
He did not glamorize the task. To train the lawyer to be a person of measures
was "a matter of the most desperately uncomfortable, hard, dirty, grubbing over
technique, a matter of developing skill, a matter of developing patience along
7
with skill."'
8
Yet the result of training students "to do" could be good, true, beautiful."
of
doldrums
The inclusion of such training could excite, stimulate, disrupt the
traditional education and open up "the meaning, of the living use and handling
of legal material, an opening up of the actual working integration of 'law,' fact'
background, and craft-skill. ""9 Such training would show that
the essence of our craftsmanship lies in skills, and wisdoms; in practical,
effective, persuasive, inventive skills for getting things done, any kind of
thing in any field; in wisdom and judgment in selecting the things to get
done; in skills in moving men into desired action, any kind of man, in any
field; and then in skills for regularizing the results, for building into controlled
large-scale action such doing of things and such moving of men.'"
Llewellyn called for the reevaluation and reintegration of practical craft training
2
into legal education.' ' It is a call which went largely unanswered.
114. K.N. LLEWELLYN, Legal Tradition and Social Science Method in JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 23,
at 87.
115. Llewellyn, supra note 86, at 654 (emphasis in original).
116. Llewellyn, supra note 43, at 333 (emphasis in original).
117. Llewellyn, supra note 92, at 3.
118. See K.N. LLEWELLYN, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law in JURISPRUDENCE, supra
note 23, at 167.
119. Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 377.
120. Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 3 (emphasis in original).
121. See K.N. LLEWELLYN, supra note 41, at 17-18:
[Procedure and evidence and trial practice] should be marked off for the most intensive study.
But they should be marked off not because they are really separate, but because they are of such
transcendent importance as to need special emphasis. They should be so marked off not to be
kept apart and distinct, but solely in order that they may be more firmly learned, more firmly
ingrained into the student as conditioning the existence of any substantive law at all.... For
what substantive law says should be means nothing except in terms of what procedure says that
you can make real. (emphasis in original)

Symposium 1989]

BAUHAUS TO COURTHOUSE

IV.
Gropius had more success in translating his vision into reality than Llewellyn. 22
' Although he had administrative, collegial, and student problems, he was
able, by selection, training, and authority, to realize his goal of producing designers who were "artists possessing sufficient technical knowledge [and] craftsmen endowed with sufficient imagination for artistic problems.' 23
The discord between the Form and Workshop Masters stimulated rather than
defeated Gropius. The debates and disputes in fact helped to liberate the Bauhaus
from the paralyzing historicism of the academy. The conflicts strengthened the
school by focusing the debate, narrowing the differences, and showing the need
for a new approach, a synthesis of the differing spheres."2
Gropius had the self-confidence to bring together strong teachers with formidable talents, allow them to expound their views, and then, by force of intellect
and personality, provide the cohesive force necessary to attain a dynamic balance. 25 Gropius was also strong enough to modify some of his original views
in light of experience and to stop what seemed to be endless bouts of theorizing.
He turned the school's direction toward production, using teachers who had been
trained to be both Form and Workshop Masters. With the disruptive hierarchy
gone, a new unity was achieved within the faculty and the school." 2
Gropius assembled and trained a remarkable faculty who shared his ideas and
were capable of teaching heads and hands simultaneously, correlating theoretical
reasoning, creative vision, and practical translation. There were no shortcuts;
there was no imitation. The Bauhaus staff worked with the students, encouraging
122. Gropius was aided by a move from the hostile environment of Weimer to the more receptive
atmosphere in Dessau where the construction of a new building and the presence of Bauhaus
trained
instructors stimulated a period of serious, practical and effective work. See Dorner, supra note 58,
at 13;
F. WHrrFoRD, supra note 58, at 164.
123. W. GROPIUS, supra note 20, at 14.
124. See Gropius, I., supra note 67, at 21; F. WHrrpoRD, supra note 58, at 201; Jacobsohn, supra
note

18, at 29. The conflicts among the masters gave Gropius headaches, but
he accepted this turmoil as a natural consequence of his trying to reconcile groups of people
who, for the last century, had completely drifted apart into isolated spheres of work and who
found it understandably hard to cooperate in daily encounters about working schedules, financial
considerations, outside pressures, and inside disagreements.
Gropius, I., supra note 68, at 24.
Gropius would have had the sympathy of many current law school deans. Perhaps in law, as in design,
some discord, some turmoil is healthy and productive of new ideas. See Jenkins, Theory and Practice in
Law, 19 U. FLA. L. REv. 404, 411 (1967):
If the practitioner is content to merely [sic] employ the apparatus already at his disposal, and
the theoretician to bring this to a yet higher surface polish, their work becomes sterile. A decent
measure of discontent is essential to all constructive work. So the practical man of affairs must
continually challenge the body of theory currently at his disposal, looking for ways in which
this can he modified so as to improve its treatment of actual cases. And the man of ideas must
be equally alert to the direction in which practice is tending, so that he can anticipate and correct
its course.
125. See Currie, A New Tribute to Walter Gropius, 143 ARCH. REc. No. 5, May 1968, at 10:
[The Bauhaus, brought together the most formidable array of talent . . . and before long had
them joined by ...

great designers, architects, and teachers ...

as diverse and dedicated and

contentious a group of creative people as has ever been assembled. Small wonder that their
interaction gave off sparks that illuminated the entire world of the creative arts. And who provided
the cohesive force to hold these energies in dynamic tension but the man with the seminal idea
of the Bauhaus-Walter Gropius. It was surely on this forge that he shaped and tempered and
tested one of his favorite maxims- "diversity within unity."
126. See F WHrrFORD, supra note 58, at 132, 147, 156; H. WINGLER, supra note 24, at 420.
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them to develop individual creative attitudes and independent conceptions of
27
solutions to problems.' The faculty was committed to "the2 slow, inner growth
that comes from personal experience and experimenting."
Patience and experimentation resulted in achieving the goals of fusing vision
and technology and developing a spirit of cooperation among people who retained
their individual identity. Creative imagination was united with practical crafts' The educational product, the new masters, in contrast with the old,
manship. 29
"were much less specialized, equally at home in the workshop and studio,
dedicated to solving practical problems, devoted to artistic activities with an
that there is no
obviously public application, and determined to demonstrate
30
essential difference between fine art and the crafts."
Gropius molded designers who were creatively ambidextrous. He did this by
thoroughly training all the creative faculties at once rather than compartmentalizing them. He preserved the unity of this training by relating it to as many
realistic conditions, by putting the
practical problems as possible, by using
3
"sense of discipline kept going a
His
'
classroom theory to the workroom test.'
be sharpened on the touchstone
visions
that
demanded
kind of formal ethic, which
32
the theoretical, the techconverged
He
process."'
and
material,
of function,
joined and interrelated
which
nical, and the practical; he evolved a curriculum
was alive, vital, and
which
study
of
course
a
the three; his synthesis produced
productive. "'
That vitality remains today both in product and in education. " What Gropius
and his colleagues developed and what lives today is "an attitude toward creathey
tivity intended to result in variety."" They achieved unity in diversity;
36
in
Working
'
dispersed.
been
had
which
that
concentrated
and
brought together
at 21.
127. See Werner, Art and Industry, 131 NEW REPUB. No. 24, Dec. 13, 1954,
128. Gropius, I.,supra note 67, at 21.
H. WINGLER, supra
129. See Von Eckardt, supra note 83, at 237; Jacobsohn, supra note 18, at 29;
note 24, at II; Domer, supra note 58, at 13.
7:
130. F. WHrrFORD, supra note 58, at 178. See also H. WINGLER, supra note 24, at
to dispense
Master craftsmen did not teach at the Dessau Bauhaus. It had now become possible
younger
with the dual appointments to the workshops, artist and craftsman side by side, since
teachers
Bauhaus-trained people were available to complement the teaching staff. These young
with manual
capability
design
combined
and
program
new
the
of
spirit
the
in
educated
been
had
skill.
supra note 20, at
131. See Dorner, supra note 58, at 12; Gropius, supra note 33, at 23; W. GROPIUS,
52; CURTIS, MODERN ARCHITECTURE SINCE 1900, 261 (1982).
132. Kallman, supra note 82, at 273.
133. See Rosensberg, Keeping Up, 46 NEW YORKER No. I, Feb. 21, 1970, at 85:
draw candid
The virtue of the Bauhaus lies in its intellectual forthrightness, its willingness to
of the
conclusions .... The Bauhaus based its program on its realization that once the idea
individual artist and his metaphysics of creation was discarded, art had to face the consequences
of finding its meaning in social utility.
See also Shaw, The Influence of the Bauhaus, in FOUR GREAT MAKERS, supra note 62, at 245.
set the standards
134. See F. WHITFORD, supra note 58, at 10: "[The Bauhaus created the patterns and
the look of everything
of present-day industrial design; it helped to invent modem architecture; it altered
from the chair you are sitting in to the page you are reading now."
COURIER 18, 27
135. Id. at 198. Cf. Schnaidt, Architects of an Educational Revolution, 33 UNESCO
between the
(April, 1980): "[L]ooking back at the Bauhaus, one cannot fail to be struck by the contrast
of its assertions
profusion of its discoveries and the paucity of their consequences, between the confidence
and the precarious fate which lay in store for them."
136. See S. GIEDION, SPACE, TIME AND ARCHITECTURE 397-98 (1947):
life,
At the Bauhaus under Gropius the effort was made to unite art and industry, art and daily
for
using architecture as the intermediary. . . . The principles of contemporary art were there
the first time translated into the field of education. Dispersed tendencies were brought together
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a cooperative yet individual way on real world problems, they achieved a "[diaring
balance, cerebral and soul equilibristics."' 37
Gropius and his colleagues brought art and technology into balance; they
stressed actual doing rather than empty posturing; they worked within their
profession and across disciplines; they erased the artificial division between
theory and application.'3 They "consolidated themselves into a working unit,
the better to translate their ideas into actual achievements. "'39 They practiced as
they taught, learning and exploring by doing. The Bauhaus under Gropius was
a living, practical institution, "practical and serviceable as a bridge,"'" and
therein lies its lesson for legal education, for realizing the vision of educators
such as Karl Llewellyn.
V.
The rupture between legal education and legal practice has existed for over
100 years. And for over 100 years, voices have been raised about the dangers
of either practice or theory dominating the other. 4 ' The need, as Llewellyn
clearly saw, "is, in some fashion, for an integration of the human and the artistic
with the legal."' 42 The practice of law-its theories, techniques, and idealsgives actual meaning, actual application to doctrine. To leave the practical craft
unstudied "is to leave unspoken and undiscussed half of the guidance and control
and soundness which lies in our actual going legal scheme of things."' 43
What Llewellyn sought was a bridge between the poles of theory and practice.
and concentrated. This treatment of the Bauhaus has been limited to those of its aspects which
have a bearing on our constant concern: the way in which this period has moved toward a
consciousness of itself. The vital and difficult development of the Bauhaus reflects that process
in the circumscribed realm of education as no other institution of that period does.
See also Gropius, Tradition and Continuity in Architecture. 135 ARCH. REc. No. 5, May 1964, at 134:
I bloodied my nose repeatedly in my attempts . . . to put visual education on a much broader
and more contemporary basis as we finally succeeded in doing at the Bauhaus. . . . rlloday, 50
years later, . . . visual training is far from being on an equal level with other subjects of education.
137. Kallai, Ten Years of Bauhaus, in FORM AND FUNCTION, supra note 26, at 174. Not all observers
have been so charmed. See P. BLAKE, FORM FOLLOWS FIASCO 143 (1977):
The Bauhaus spawned more Good Design than any one breeding ground established or identified
in this century. Among the products developed by its masters and students were not only unsittable
chairs, backbreaking beds, and unreadable type; there were also many of those educational toys
that our children hate; water pitchers that titillate your visual perceptions while wetting your
pants; coffee-making machines . . . so complicated as to make one want to switch to tea; a
"samovar with spirit lamp and small pot for tea essence," consisting of so many grotesque
cubist, pre-cubist, and post-cubist movable (and static) parts that you might want to switch back
to coffee; and finally, a whole series of floor, wall, and ceiling lamps designed by someone who
had obviously been maddened in real life by the problem of replacing a light bulb.
138. See Currie, supra note 125, at 10.
139. Levy, supra note 98, at 71. See also Kallman, supra note 82, at 277.
140. Calverton, The Cultural Barometer, 47 CUR. HIST. No. 3, Dec. 1937, at 90-91.
141. See Coffin, The Law School and the Profession: A Need for Bridges, I I NOVA L. REV. 1053,
1056 (1987):
[ln 1883, the first Dean of the [Harvard] Faculty, Ephriam Gurney, deeply concerned about
"the contemptuous way which both Langdell and Ames have of speaking of Courts and Judges,"
had written President Eliot these ominous forebodings about Langdell:
He is as intransigent as a French Socialist, and his ideal is to breed professors of Law, not
practitioners; erring, as it seems to me, on the other side from the other schools, which would
make only practitioners. Now to my mind it will be a dark day for the School when either of
these views is able to dominate the other. . . . (emphasis in original)
142. Llewellyn, supra note 86, at 663.
143. K.N. LLEWELLYN, supra note 53, at 136-37.
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Like Gropius, he sought to interweave the two into a whole, to give students
an appreciation of the doing as well as the doctrine, to train them in the traits
necessary for a lifetime of practice. He wanted to integrate practical craft components into the classroom, putting an end to what may be seen as a form of
educational apartheid practiced by the entrenched professoriate.'"
Llewellyn felt that a legal education which ignored the practical craft components cheated the students and disserved the public. It remains true today as
it was for Llewellyn: we train students to be lawyers, to be people of effective
reckonable action, to understand what lawyers do, how they do it, and how it
can be done better. Any legal education which focuses exclusively or primarily
on rule accumulation is deficient. 45 That is a passive, not an active, education.
It is not an education for people who are to do.'"
Gropius and his colleagues at the Bauhaus saw that the best form of education
brought students face to face with real problems, demanding that they observe,
plan, and execute solutions. The same holds true for legal education. Students
best learn "by confronting the infinite frustrations and dilemmas that come from
having to make decisions, not just reviewing the decisions of others."' 47 Learning
is achieved from practice of the lawyering craft. Professor Michelman described
it as an
active learning ...

learning in which the student is called upon to respond

to the demands of a professional role into which he or she is cast, in actuality
or in simulation ....

[Piractical is an inseparable aspect of proper cognitive

144. Clinicians are in a position to help build the bridge. See Bodensteiner, An Explanation of Clinical
Education, in MAXIMIZING, supra note 3, at 166:
[The clinical method] provides a unique opportunity, for both professor and student, to bridge
what is often perceived as a huge gap between theory and practice. . . . Any pretense that there
exists an all-pervasive dichotomy between theory and practice is harmful. Just the opposite is
true: theory and practice should be intertwined.
145. See Wald, Teaching the Trade: An Appellate Judge's View of Practice-Oriented Legal Education,
36 J. LEGAL ED. 35 (1986); Morgan, supra note 7; Mentschikoff and Stotzky, supra note 89, at 743:
The law schools . . . must teach a broad range of the crafts of the law. . . . This is certainly
not a new proposal. Indeed, since the thirties, experimental work has been going on in [the
major crafts of the law]. Yet, legal education has progressed very little from the days in which
rules were said to determine results and skills training was unknown. The hope that there would
be a rapid increase in the development of materials and teaching techniques in the crafts of law
in the post World War 11 era never materialized. . . . We must reverse this trend. Academic
lawyers must do the research necessary to teach these skills.
146. See White, Doctrine in a Vacuum: Reflections on What a Law School Ought (And Ought Not) to
Be, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 251, 259-60 (1985):
ITihe kind of knowledge with which a true education is concerned is never repeatable data, but
a knowledge that entails a use or activity-a knowledge of practice that is a kind of action,
including a kind of invention or creation. . . . What you learn in law school is not law in the
sense of repeatable propositions but how to learn law--that is, how to do it and how to make
it. . . . A good law school is thus a school of law-making. This means that the proper focus of
attention is not on what the student is learning to repeat or to describe but what she is learning
to see and to do; on the doctrine or language of the law not abstracted from experience, but
embedded in it, as the object and medium of thought, expression, and intellectual action.
147. Wald, supra note 145, at 42-43. See also Horwitz, supra note 10, at 391; Cavers, "Skills" and
Understanding, I J. LEGAL ED. 395, 396-97 (1949):
ITlhe lawyer. . . is a man of decision and action, a fact we tend to overlook in our preoccupation
with the analytical and deliberative aspects of his work. Each non-routine operation of the lawyer
is likely to involve him in a series of decisions as he determines upon action calculated not only
to resolve the issues immediately before him, but also favorably to predispose, so far as practicable, all those future questions that he can forsee may be implicated in his present action. He
must, therefore, constantly examine legal materials in relation to the various uses to which he
may wish to put them.
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learning. It is axiomatic in learning theory that when cognitive studies are
accompanied by active engagement in their application to concrete problems,
a likely result is fuller comprehension, better retention, and apter recall of
the cognitive material., 8

The goal should be an integration, not a segregation, of applied and analytical
skills, orienting students to the real world of lawyering performance. Students
must be trained to think about what they will do as lawyers and to learn from
what they do. The true aim of legal education must be giving students the aptitude
and attitude necessary for a career in the craft.149
Llewellyn began preaching about that goal more than 50 years ago, yet its
realization seems almost as distant now as then." S This may result from what
148. Michelman, The Parts and the Whole: Non-Euclidean Curricular Geometry, 32 J.LEGAL ED. 352,
353-54 (1982) (emphasis in original). See also Kissam, supra note 100, at 254:
I believe that the study and practice of law would be improved by a more contextual approach
to legal education, an approach that places a greater emphasis on both the application of law to
concrete situations and the understanding of how law serves or fails to serve conflicting social
values. This approach would improve professional education by initiating future practitioners
into the uncertainties, complexities, and value conflicts of the "practice situation." It would also
promote a legal system that is more self-consciously "responsive to social needs."
As any reading of recent issues of the Journal of Legal Education will show, there are many teachers in
different disciplines who are using an active, craft-oriented approach. See Calhoun, The Law and the Little
Big Horn: What Beginning Law Students Can Learn from General Custer, 36 J.LEGAL ED. 403 (1986);
McAninch, Experiential Learning in a Traditional Classroom, 36 J.LEGAL ED. 420 (1986); Spiegelman,
Civil Procedure and Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Lawyer's Role and the Opportunity for Change,
37 J.LEGAL ED. 26 (1987); Garth, ADR and Civil Procedure: A Chapter or an Organizing Theme?, 37
J. LEGAL ED. 34 (1987); Schneider, Rethinking the Teaching of Civil Procedure, 37 J. LEGAL ED. 41
(1987); Bush, Using Process Observation to Teach Alternative Dispute Resolution: Alternatives to Simulation, 37 J.LEGAL ED. 46 (1987); Johnson, Audiovisual Enhancement of Classroom Teaching: A Primer
for Law Professors, 37 J.LEGAL ED. 97 (1987); Anderson and Kirkwood, Teaching Civil Procedure with
the Aid of Local Tort Litigation, 37 J. LEGAL ED. 215 (1987); Burg, supra note 102; Fry, Simulating
Dynamics: Using Role-Playing to Teach the Process of Bankruptcy Reorganization, 37 J.LEGAL ED. 253
(1987); Herwitz, Teaching Skills in a Business Law Setting: A Course in Business Lawyering, 37 J.LEGAL
ED. 261 (1987); Grosberg, The Buffalo Creek Disaster: An Effective Supplement to a Conventional Civil
Procedure Course, 37 J.LEGAL ED 378 (1987).
149. See Holmes, supra note 5, at 564:
Applied-skills training has the merit of forging problem-solving judgment and the intellectual
skills taught by the case method. Case-method analytical skill is inculcated through the readingreasoning operations of law students. They acquire the ability to analyze, distinguish, reconcile
and synthesize ... as well as the ability to make independent, critical commentary. Case-method
training provides students with tools to be applied in performing lawyering operations. In turn
applied training enhances those case skills by using them in a functional context. (emphasis in
original)
See also Mudd, supra note 4, at 197-98:
To orient students toward the real world they will encounter, law schools must take their reference
points from lawyer performance. Law faculties need to understand lawyering in its several
dimensions and take care not to narrow the description of lawyers' work to those portions which
the professors have encountered personally or to which they areattracted. The task is to introduce
students to the real world of lawyer performance, not a world trimmed to suit professors' interests.
150. See Redlich, Professional Responsibilities of Law Teachers, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 623,627 (1980):
Law teachers should not only have respect for the views of other faculty members, but also for
the progams in which their colleagues may be involved. This does not mean that the programs
should not be critically questioned. But a law professor teaching a traditional course should not
view clinicians, writing instructors, or trial practice teachers as second-class citizens. All are
engaged in the academic enterprise. If we want students to perform all of their professional tasks
at a high level ... then we should develop in our students a respect for excellence and integrity
in the performance of work .... While teaching students "to think like lawyers" may represent
the mental mother lode of a lawyer's career, those other lawyering skills . . .are essential in
order to mine that resource. Respect for those engaged in imparting those vital skills reflects a
respect for the lawyering profession as distinct from a respect for academic excellence alone. A
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one writer calls "an elitist bias within the law school community against" practical craft training programs.'' Perhaps it is more politely called "intellectual
incompatibility."' 52 Whatever we call it, it undeniably exists.' 53 Yet the greater
problem may lie with those of us who see ourselves as teachers of people who
will practice the craft. We rightly complain about the second class treatment we
receive. Yet we take few steps to show how what we know and do can be
integrated into the traditional legal education." We make little effort to bridge
the gap. We may be guilty of self-segregation.
We speak disparagingly of academics as being inbred and unworldly; academics regard us as vocationalists, training in tricks and ploys. We are the
Workshop Masters; they are the Form Masters. Legal education may need a
Gropius, a Bauhaus, to demonstrate that an integration is needed and possible.
law teacher who glorifies mediocre scholarship because it is a lofty endeavor, but who scorns
the teaching of lawyering skills as pedestrian, will produce students who will be bad scholars
and bad lawyers. Neither their ideas nor their skills will be worthy of attention.
Perhaps my comment is overly pessimistic. Much is being done by individual teachers as seen in the articles
cited in footnote 150. Schools such as CUNY and Montana are attempting to educate with an integrated
curriculum designed to inculcate many of the craft traits. The organized bar is interested in the problem
as witnessed by the recent American Bar Association National Conference on Professional Skills and Legal
Education. But these efforts only underscore the point that, for the most part, legal educators do not see
their role as educating students for the practice of the craft.
151. Devitt, Why Don't Law Schools Teach Law Students How to Try Law Suits?, 29 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 631, 638 (1980). The author continued:
The law schools must learn to accept the need for polished skills training and clinical programs
and take the steps necessary to ensure the success of those programs. They must strive to eliminate
the indicia of inferiority presently so common in the treatment of clinical professors. They must,
in short, give their clinical and skills training programs the priority those programs deserve and
need. To do so certainly is in the best interests of the profession and the public. It also is in the
best interests of law schools.
Id.
152. Hardaway, Problems in Clinical Integration: A Case Study of the Integrated Clinical Program of
the University of Denver College of Law, 59 DENVER L. J. 459, 464 (1982).
153. See Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 873 n. 58 (1987) where the author
says that "one of the most striking characteristics of our leading law schools today is the attitude of contempt
that prevails in them toward the old-fashioned virtue of practical wisdom." He continued:
There will, of course, always be a separation of sorts between those who choose an academic
career in law and those who practice their craft in some more worldly setting. In this country,
such a separation has existed for at least a century, since legal education began to assume an
academic character. In recent years, however, the separation has widened considerably. Most
practicing lawyers still believe that excellence in the practice of law requires prudence or sound
judgment, a view shared by those law teachers whose primary identification continues to be with
the practicing bar. Many law teachers, however . . . take a different and more disparaging view
of these qualities. In their view, an insistence on the importance of practical wisdom is to be
regarded either as an ideological ploy or as a sign of scientific naivete. To be sure, practicing
lawyers and law teachers inevitably will have different interests and aims. This difference in
outlook becomes troubling, however, when it is accompanied by a loss of respect on the one
side for the qualities of mind and temperament whose possession is regarded by those on the
other as a badge of professional pride.
154. See Munger, Clinical Legal Education: The Case Against Separatism, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 715,
734 (1980):
The future of the clinician lies in becoming part of the mainstream of legal education in ways
other than expanding the clinic. Clinical faculty must show that what they have learned has
broad application in teaching core curriculum courses. Clinicians are still viewed as representing
goals which are secondary or supplemental to those of the mainstream of legal education. ...
By offering better methods of training lawyers, the clinical movement has an important role to
play in improving legal education.
Also see H. PACKER AND T. EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 39 (1972) evaluating
clinical education along the axes of student involvement, faculty supervision, and "academic integration,
the extent to which the experience is blended with other aspects of the student's program."
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Or, perhaps, it needs to pay heed to those within its own walls, like Llewellyn,
who have worked toward that goal.
We in the Workshop must show that what we have learned has broad application
to a quality legal education. We must convince the Form Masters that the lessons
of the workshop can be and must be blended in with other aspects of legal
education. We, whether we are called clinical or skills or craft teachers,
have a crucial role to play in the gradual transformation of the student
experience in law school. Many [of us] have wrestled for years with the
issue of how to enrich the education of the individual students whom [we]
supervise so intensively. When [we] have been self-reflective about [our]
work, [we] have had to grapple as well with the issue of bridging theory
and practice for these students. [We] need to continue devoting [our] efforts
to creating opportunities for experiential learning in the clinical setting. But
[we] also need to make [our] teaching skills and methods available in the
classroom and to [our] colleagues who work there. There is no more effective
way than this to demonstrate that [our] concerns . . . go beyond the im-

mediate case; that "skills" as well as "analysis" are indispensible to lawyers
and both are compatible as teaching methods; and that what [we] do is
intellectually and professionally worthy of the respect of [our classroom]
peers.

155

1 56
What we cannot afford to do is to barricade ourselves in the workroom.
A legal education which produces graduates who only think like lawyers illserves them, the profession, and the public. A legal education which produces
graduates armed only with techniques is a menace. Legal education must be
intellectually based, humanistically motivated, and craft oriented. 5 7 Like the

155. Burg, supra note 102, at 251-52. See also Keyes, Approaches and Stumbling Blocks to Integration
of Skills Training and the Traditional Methods of Teaching Law, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 685, 691 (1980):
The advantage of [integrating clinical law into the curriculum) include [sic] the following. First,
the public will benefit by receiving a more competent lawyer who relates his legal knowledge
to the solution of the problems of his clients. Second, the legal profession will benefit because
it will have a better image ....
Third, the law schools will initiate an honest goal of training
lawyers, thereby gaining students' respect due to the increased relevance of the education provided. Fourth, the law school graduate will be more competent to practice law, having obtained
a blend of the skills required for practice. Fifth, the law schools will have commenced a program
of upgrading its [sic] faculty according to their abilities to teach practically as well as academically.
It will help to reorient the priorities of faculty members in addition to drawing them toward the
practicing bar from which many have become estranged.
156. See Cramton, supra note 13, at 331-32:
The addition of courses focusing on lawyering skills will broaden and deepen the law curriculum
only if those courses are infused with a theoretical and critical perspective. If they merely reinforce
the existing vocational orientation of the traditional skills courses . . . they will have failed.
Courses in interviewing, negotiation, counseling, and advocacy will acquire a permanent place
in the basic curriculum of the university law school because they are founded on insightful,
theoretical explanations of why lawyers and officials behave as they do and because they produce
important empirical findings that illuminate how lawyers, clients, and officials behave and interact
or lead to valuable normative statements of how they should behave.
157. See F. ALLEN, LAW, INTELLECT, AND EDUCATION 89 (1979):
[Ilt seems clear that the needs for greater practical training being expressed today by many
lawyers, judges, and law students cannot sensibly be ignored by the law schools. Nor should it
be assumed that concern with practical professional skills is necessarily at odds with a legal
education intellectually based and humanistically motivated. Attention to practice problems can
contribute interest and realism to the study of law and thus contribute to the realization of the
multitudinous objectives of legal education, including the enhancement of professional competency. The increased emphasis on practical skills becomes a threat to university training only
when it ignores the broad range of values and social interests that legal education is called upon
to cultivate. Such insistence tends toward a narrowing of vision and a lowering of aspirations.
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Bauhaus, it "must engage [students] in a continuous process of thinking and
learning from their own activity, integrating intellect with performance, theory
with practice."' 58
We who teach for the practice of the craft must convince students and colleagues that the integration of head and hand, of thinking and doing is the
hallmark of a true professional.' 59 Perhaps then the distinction between craft
teachers and traditional law teachers will disappear.' We are, after all, engaged
in the same enterprise: the education of men and women for a career in the craft
of the law."'6 The work of each of us is of equal importance for the final result.
Doctrinal and performance instruction must be combined into a whole designed
to produce competent craft practitioners. Gropius and Llewellyn were craft teachers and bridge builders. They saw the value of this integration. Their efforts
demonstrate that it can be done.
158. Payton, Is Thinking Like a Lawyer Enough?, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 233, 238 (1985). See also
Mentschikoff and Stotzky, supra note 89, at 743, n.78:
One of the things that terrifies us as we look at the law school world and see that skills are often
taught without substance or that information is stressed to the exclusion of an understanding of
the process, is that those who are being trained in that limited way are simply never going to
know what they do not know. They will simply be unable to judge adequately the necessary
ingredients of a competent lawyer.
159. See Cramton, The Need for Greater Emphasis on Skills Development. in LAWYER COMPETENCY,
supra note 50, at 15-16:
As I see it there are many unexplored, or relatively unexplored, areas about professional operations, the professional role, and acting as a lawyer in a decision-making and strategic context
which are intellectually interesting and significant, and which will attract and enlist the attention
of fine minds. . . .The ultimate justification for finding a place for these things . . . is that these
matters do have intellectual substance, that these are fields of research about which much can
be said in terms of the development of generalizations and new insights, and that they are as
important as much of the kind of doctrinal research that one sees in law reviews, or as the lawreform oriented or empirical research that one sees in other settings. . . .The work has not yet
been done and the proof has not yet been fully established. But I think it will be, and I think
we ought to take the plunge because if we are successful, we can radically improve the quality
of our graduates, make law school more interesting and feel much happier teaching things which
the students are happy studying and learning. Such a plunge, then may have synergistic effects
which will benefit society and improve our own psychology and morale.
160. See Burg, supra note 102, at 233:
[Tihe gulf separating clinic and classroom appears to have narrowed. I remain committed to
client-based clinical education as a distinct process; but I have also come to see the possibilities
inherent in the integration of clinical perspectives with classroom instruction. . . . IThis viewpoint . . . may have been initiated by a growing awareness that the only feasible way to share
at least some of the benefits of clinical learning with most law students is to cycle those benefits
in some form through the nonclinical curriculum. It seems to me that the time for experimentation
with integration is at hand.
161. See Eisele, supra note 1,at 389:
[Llaw . .. is an activity, an activity of artistry. . . . While it is clear that a part of our legal
knowledge and legal education is expressed in and by the roles of law that we study, it also is
clear that these rules are not sufficient in themselsves to produce or represent our knowledge of
law or of an education in the law. To know the activity of the law, we shall have to know how
we teach it, how we learn it,
and how we practice it. Thus, among other things, to learn what
law is, which puzzles us, we shall have to learn what the activity of being a lawyer is,a still
more puzzling matter.
See also Ross, supra note 16, at 871:
We owe our students the opportunity to live greatly within the law, and to do that one must
somehow reconcile the vision of law as it ought to be with the law as it is. Simply pretending
that law is in fact something it is not is a bad form of reconciliation. Yet reacting with cynicism
and putting aside one's ideals and values is worse. To live greatly within the law one must
embrace the reality without giving up the vision. One must accept the idea that a vision which
will never be fully realized is nonetheless worth pursuing.

